In my last post I described the doctrine of restraint, a doctrine that is basic to justificatory liberalism but which Christopher Eberle rejects. In short, Eberle believes that once religious citizens have conscientiously engaged other citizens they do not need to restrain themselves from supporting coercive public policies. Religious citizens may demonstrate respect toward other citizens even as they support public policies solely on the basis of their religious beliefs. In contrast, justificatory liberals believe that religious citizens ought to restrain themselves from supporting public policies that they are unable to justify publicly.
But why is restraint so controversial? Liberals have long valued religious liberty as a basic matter of political justice, and at first glance the doctrine of restraint flows naturally from this commitment; to impose coercive policies solely on the basis of religious premises conflicts with this ideal, or so justificatory liberals might argue (Eberle, of course, disagrees with the premise that policies that flow solely from religious premises inherently violate religious liberty). The seminal political philosophers John Rawls speaks well in this vein. The doctrine of restraint flows first from the reality of reasonable pluralism, the fact that our society consists of a diversity of incommensurable, reasonable conceptions of the good--for a liberal democracy, "the normal result of its culture of free institutions" (Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," 573 in Collected Papers). Because citizens are fundamentally divided about their respective value commitments, it behooves citizens of a liberal democracy to refrain from supporting policies that infringe upon the deeply-held comprehensive beliefs of other reasonable citizens (Rawls, along with other liberal democrats, precludes unreasonable comprehensive beliefs from the mix, which seems right even as it raises the question about what qualifies any belief system as "reasonable"). As Rawls says, "Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions--were we to state them as government officials--are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons" ("Public Reason Revisited," 578). The point is that political power in a liberal democracy needs to be united with reasons that can be justified to citizens who do not accept our deeply held beliefs; We need to pursue "public reasons." Restraint is simply the corollary of this commitment. Because the liberal citizen needs to find reasons that may persuade citizens who do not share her religious beliefs, when the liberal citizen is unable to find such reasons she should restrain herself from supporting the policy.
So why does Eberle find the doctrine of restraint so problematic? Surprisingly, Eberle never enumerates his reasons for objecting to restraint, but his concerns are implicit in several places in his book. Most importantly, Eberle believes that the doctrine of restraint puts some religious citizens in an untenable position. At least some religious citizens take obedience to God as the principle mandate for all of life, and for them the prospect of restraining themselves from supporting policies consistent with this obedience will be psychologically "doubtful." Eberle worries that the doctrine of restraint, along with other social dynamics internal to modern liberal democracies, encourages citizens to privatize their religious commitments, to treat them as mere lifestyle choices of little public consequence (144). For citizens who believe that God's will is an overriding concern for human life, the doctrine of restraint entails that they compromise this deeply held conviction in order to participate in public policy discourse, or that they simply abandon public life altogether to remain faithful to God.
Second, Eberle believes that the doctrine of restraint itself lacks any sort of rational justification (i.e. for reasons that we will examine later, he is not persuaded by arguments like that of Rawls, above). Thus, to impose it on religious citizens is itself a violation of the norm of respect. The doctrine of restraint embodies the very browbeating that concerns secular critics of religious citizens (150-151).
Third, Eberle also believes that justificatory liberals have failed to offer a defensible account of what public reason is that at the same time (1) non-arbitrary, and (2) capable of precluding religious reasons without also precluding reasons basic to rudimentary political discourse. But the doctrine of restraint requires some account of what qualifies as a public reason. Because justificatory liberals have yet to offer a defensible definition of public reason that responds effectively to these criticisms, the doctrine of restraint exemplifies one way that non-idealized citizens simply express their own disagreements with one another.
While I'm describing what Eberle believes is wrong with restraint, I'll close with a fourth concern, expressed most forcefully by Jeffrey Stout in his book Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). In chapter 3 of his book, Stout responds at length to Rawls's argument for public reason. In his later work, Rawls argues that religious citizens may introduce reasons from their reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious and otherwise, "provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support" (Political Liberalism, li-lii). As Stout observes, this language makes it sound as if religious reasons serve the function of political IOU's, with cash payment to be proffered at some later point. Stout observes that by this standard Christian abolitionists and Martin Luther King Jr. themselves barely qualify; did they ever fulfill this proviso (Democracy and Tradition, 69)? For Stout, as for Eberle, the doctrine of restraint too quickly abandons more dialogical approaches to public discourse that entail giving and listening to one another's reasons, stepping into the shoes of the other, conscientiously engaging other citizens.
As I stated in part 1, I think Eberle is wrong here, but I'm nearing the end of this post. In part 5 I will present one of the stronger arguments for the doctrine of restraint and will explore Eberle's argument against it.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Part 3): The Doctrine of Restraint
Today I turn my attention to the major issue at the heart of Chris Eberle's book Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. In my earlier posts I noted that there is a lot about which Eberle and other liberal democratic scholars agree concerning the obligations of respectful citizenship. The ideal of conscientious engagement, which I reviewed in my last post, well summarizes the overlap between Eberle and justificatory liberals. Everyone agrees that democratic respect requires that we sympathetically engage other citizens, trying to view the world from their perspective, seeking out reasons that we believe might reasonably persuade them about the justness of the coercive policies that we support.
But here is the rub: justificatory liberals believe that respect requires more than conscientious engagement. Respect also requires that we restrain ourselves from supporting laws solely on the basis of our comprehensive (e.g. religious) beliefs. For justificatory liberals--scholars like John Rawls, Charles Larmore, Robert Audi, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutmann, Lawrence Solum, and many others--respect requires public justification of coercion (54). The definitions of public justification and its corollary, public reason, are notoriously complex (and there is notable diversity among justificatory liberals about the proper understanding of the terms), but the general idea is that coercive policies need to be justified on bases that other citizens can accept from within their own comprehensive belief systems. If citizens are unable to find reasons that qualify as public in this sense than it is disrespectful for them to continue advocating the policy.
A lot needs to be said about public reason/justification, but I'm setting this aside for a later post. To get closer to the doctrine of restraint, I want us to consider the case of citizen X once again, a deeply committed religious believer whose religious beliefs motivate him to support the enactment of policy Z. Citizen X's religious faith is fundamental to his support of policy Z. Absent his religious faith, in fact, citizen X realizes that he would feel no real need to advocate for the policy. Nevertheless, citizen X holds fast to his religious belief, and he expresses strong public support for policy Z. What does respect require? For justificatory liberals and for Eberle alike, citizen X needs to realize that many of the citizens who will be affected by policy Z do not share his religious beliefs. He needs to take the concerns of these citizens seriously. He needs to respect them by earnestly seeking reasons for the policy that they might find acceptable (even when those reasons are not his own primary reasons for supporting the policy). He needs to engage in imminent critique, finding ways that they might be able to support policy Z from within their own reasonable comprehensive belief system. In short, he must conscientiously engage them.
But what happens if public justification fails? What if citizen X can find no public reasons capable of convincing reasonable citizens? What if the only reasons available to citizen X are those that emerge from his deeply-held religious beliefs? Justificatory liberals say that citizen X should no longer support the public policy. To continue to advocate for policy Z would show disrespect to other citizens. Respect requires that citizen X restrain himself from supporting the policy. Eberle disagrees. Eberle believes that as long as John makes an earnest effort to pursue public justification he has exercised his moral obligations and may continue to push for the enactment of policy Z, even solely on the basis of his religious beliefs.
In my next post I'll give some explanation about why Eberle believes that the doctrine of restraint to be flawed.
But here is the rub: justificatory liberals believe that respect requires more than conscientious engagement. Respect also requires that we restrain ourselves from supporting laws solely on the basis of our comprehensive (e.g. religious) beliefs. For justificatory liberals--scholars like John Rawls, Charles Larmore, Robert Audi, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutmann, Lawrence Solum, and many others--respect requires public justification of coercion (54). The definitions of public justification and its corollary, public reason, are notoriously complex (and there is notable diversity among justificatory liberals about the proper understanding of the terms), but the general idea is that coercive policies need to be justified on bases that other citizens can accept from within their own comprehensive belief systems. If citizens are unable to find reasons that qualify as public in this sense than it is disrespectful for them to continue advocating the policy.
A lot needs to be said about public reason/justification, but I'm setting this aside for a later post. To get closer to the doctrine of restraint, I want us to consider the case of citizen X once again, a deeply committed religious believer whose religious beliefs motivate him to support the enactment of policy Z. Citizen X's religious faith is fundamental to his support of policy Z. Absent his religious faith, in fact, citizen X realizes that he would feel no real need to advocate for the policy. Nevertheless, citizen X holds fast to his religious belief, and he expresses strong public support for policy Z. What does respect require? For justificatory liberals and for Eberle alike, citizen X needs to realize that many of the citizens who will be affected by policy Z do not share his religious beliefs. He needs to take the concerns of these citizens seriously. He needs to respect them by earnestly seeking reasons for the policy that they might find acceptable (even when those reasons are not his own primary reasons for supporting the policy). He needs to engage in imminent critique, finding ways that they might be able to support policy Z from within their own reasonable comprehensive belief system. In short, he must conscientiously engage them.
But what happens if public justification fails? What if citizen X can find no public reasons capable of convincing reasonable citizens? What if the only reasons available to citizen X are those that emerge from his deeply-held religious beliefs? Justificatory liberals say that citizen X should no longer support the public policy. To continue to advocate for policy Z would show disrespect to other citizens. Respect requires that citizen X restrain himself from supporting the policy. Eberle disagrees. Eberle believes that as long as John makes an earnest effort to pursue public justification he has exercised his moral obligations and may continue to push for the enactment of policy Z, even solely on the basis of his religious beliefs.
In my next post I'll give some explanation about why Eberle believes that the doctrine of restraint to be flawed.
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Part 2): The Ideal of Conscientious Engagement
Yesterday I posted an introduction to the major questions that Chris Eberle explores in his book Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. I indicated that in my next post I would summarize Eberle's case against the doctrine of restraint, but it has become clear to me that it would be better for me to precede this with a summary of what Eberle's position shares in common with justificatory liberalism (JL). Thus, I'll reserve discussion of the doctrine of restraint for a future post. Today I'll talk about the "ideal of conscientious engagement."
Let's imagine citizen X, a religious person deeply concerned by the direction that culture has taken (note: I'm purposefully avoiding language like "moral decline" or "social injustice" so as to not suggest that citizen X is by nature conservative or liberal. The exact issues of concern are not relevant to the point I'm illustrating). Citizen X feels strongly about a variety of issues, and his religious faith inspires him to speak out on these issues in order to steer public policy to address these problems. But citizen X is faced with a choice about how, precisely, he speaks out about these issues. Citizen X could, for example, simply offer zealous defenses of public policies that flow from his deeply held beliefs irrespective of the protests of citizens who do not share these beliefs. He could strive to martial political power so that policies are enacted consistent with his deeply held beliefs. He could blithely ignore the objections of non-believers, dismissing their reasons as evidence of their heterodoxy or moral depravity.
Liberal theorists would treat this sort of posturing as a quintessential example of disrespect. To ignore the voice of other citizens who do not share one's deeply held religious beliefs is illiberal; we are being bad citizens when we do so. Fortunately, other postures are available to citizen X. Citizen X could choose to conscientiously engage other citizens who do not share his deeply held beliefs. Eberle, with justificatory liberals, argues that conscientious engagement is critical to meaning of respect in a liberal democracy. Conscientious engagement entails some constraints on how we engage other citizens. Eberle highlights 6 constraints that make up the ideal of conscientious engagement. To demonstrate respect for other citizens, Citizen X will do the following (104-105):
(1) She will pursue a high degree of rational justification for the claim that a favored coercive policy is morally appropriate.
(2) She will withhold support from a given coercive policy if she can't acquire a sufficiently high degree of rational justification for the claim that that policy is morally appropriate.
(3) She will attempt to communicate to her compatriots her reasons for coercing them.
(4) She will pursue public justification for her favored coercive policies.
(5) She will listen to her compatriots' evaluation of her reasons for her favored coercive policies with the intention of learning from them about the moral (im)propriety of those policies.
(6) She will not support any policy on the basis of a rationale that denies the dignity of her compatriots.
The ideal of conscientious engagement points to the critical role of discourse in liberal democratic politics. Because laws are coercive it is important that citizens remain open to the reasons offered by other citizens about the merits of public policies, especially those citizens with whom we disagree. In public discourse respect requires that we pursue reasons that we can reasonably expect other citizens will accept, even when we disagree with one another about our comprehensive beliefs (Note: Eberle's appeal to public justification in (4), above, is problematic in relation to the overall logic of his book, in which one of the central claims is that there is no way of establishing a coherent, defensible account of what qualifies as public reason. I hope to address this in a future post).
I'll conclude this post with a concrete example that will clarify what it means to live up to the ideal of conscientious engagement. Public policy pertaining to same-sex relations stands as one of the more controversial public policy issues today. One could well imagine religiously motivated citizens--Christians who believe that same-sex relationships are against natural and divine law, for example--calling for the repeal of laws that forbid discrimination against same sex couples, or advocating for the reestablishment of sodomy laws that punish consensual same-sex activity. Let's imagine that Citizen X is a religiously-motivated citizen of this sort. He is morally opposed to gay marriage. He is against public policies that in his view legitimize same-sex sexual activity (e.g. anti-discrimination laws that protect gay and lesbian individuals), and he laments the invalidation of sodomy laws by the 2003 Supreme Court ruling, Lawrence V. Texas . According to Eberle, the ideal of conscientious engagement requires that citizen X make an earnest effort to communicate the merits of these policies to citizens who do not share his religious beliefs. Citizen X needs to take seriously that the coercive laws that he supports will cause no small amount of distress for those citizens who do not share his beliefs. Thus, he must
seek reasons that these other citizens might reasonably accept, even when these reasons are not the primary reasons why he himself advocates these laws. Citizen X must adopt a posture of openness to the counterclaims of other citizens. On these matters Eberle's vision of liberal democratic respect coincides with that of justificatory liberals.
This is another long post, so I'll close with a cliffhanger. Eberle and justificatory liberals agree about the importance of conscientious engagement. But what does respect require when public reasons are unavailable or evidentially insufficient to justify a public policy? On this point Eberle parts company with JL. I'll turn my attention to this in my next post.
Let's imagine citizen X, a religious person deeply concerned by the direction that culture has taken (note: I'm purposefully avoiding language like "moral decline" or "social injustice" so as to not suggest that citizen X is by nature conservative or liberal. The exact issues of concern are not relevant to the point I'm illustrating). Citizen X feels strongly about a variety of issues, and his religious faith inspires him to speak out on these issues in order to steer public policy to address these problems. But citizen X is faced with a choice about how, precisely, he speaks out about these issues. Citizen X could, for example, simply offer zealous defenses of public policies that flow from his deeply held beliefs irrespective of the protests of citizens who do not share these beliefs. He could strive to martial political power so that policies are enacted consistent with his deeply held beliefs. He could blithely ignore the objections of non-believers, dismissing their reasons as evidence of their heterodoxy or moral depravity.
Liberal theorists would treat this sort of posturing as a quintessential example of disrespect. To ignore the voice of other citizens who do not share one's deeply held religious beliefs is illiberal; we are being bad citizens when we do so. Fortunately, other postures are available to citizen X. Citizen X could choose to conscientiously engage other citizens who do not share his deeply held beliefs. Eberle, with justificatory liberals, argues that conscientious engagement is critical to meaning of respect in a liberal democracy. Conscientious engagement entails some constraints on how we engage other citizens. Eberle highlights 6 constraints that make up the ideal of conscientious engagement. To demonstrate respect for other citizens, Citizen X will do the following (104-105):
(1) She will pursue a high degree of rational justification for the claim that a favored coercive policy is morally appropriate.
(2) She will withhold support from a given coercive policy if she can't acquire a sufficiently high degree of rational justification for the claim that that policy is morally appropriate.
(3) She will attempt to communicate to her compatriots her reasons for coercing them.
(4) She will pursue public justification for her favored coercive policies.
(5) She will listen to her compatriots' evaluation of her reasons for her favored coercive policies with the intention of learning from them about the moral (im)propriety of those policies.
(6) She will not support any policy on the basis of a rationale that denies the dignity of her compatriots.
The ideal of conscientious engagement points to the critical role of discourse in liberal democratic politics. Because laws are coercive it is important that citizens remain open to the reasons offered by other citizens about the merits of public policies, especially those citizens with whom we disagree. In public discourse respect requires that we pursue reasons that we can reasonably expect other citizens will accept, even when we disagree with one another about our comprehensive beliefs (Note: Eberle's appeal to public justification in (4), above, is problematic in relation to the overall logic of his book, in which one of the central claims is that there is no way of establishing a coherent, defensible account of what qualifies as public reason. I hope to address this in a future post).
I'll conclude this post with a concrete example that will clarify what it means to live up to the ideal of conscientious engagement. Public policy pertaining to same-sex relations stands as one of the more controversial public policy issues today. One could well imagine religiously motivated citizens--Christians who believe that same-sex relationships are against natural and divine law, for example--calling for the repeal of laws that forbid discrimination against same sex couples, or advocating for the reestablishment of sodomy laws that punish consensual same-sex activity. Let's imagine that Citizen X is a religiously-motivated citizen of this sort. He is morally opposed to gay marriage. He is against public policies that in his view legitimize same-sex sexual activity (e.g. anti-discrimination laws that protect gay and lesbian individuals), and he laments the invalidation of sodomy laws by the 2003 Supreme Court ruling, Lawrence V. Texas . According to Eberle, the ideal of conscientious engagement requires that citizen X make an earnest effort to communicate the merits of these policies to citizens who do not share his religious beliefs. Citizen X needs to take seriously that the coercive laws that he supports will cause no small amount of distress for those citizens who do not share his beliefs. Thus, he must
seek reasons that these other citizens might reasonably accept, even when these reasons are not the primary reasons why he himself advocates these laws. Citizen X must adopt a posture of openness to the counterclaims of other citizens. On these matters Eberle's vision of liberal democratic respect coincides with that of justificatory liberals.
This is another long post, so I'll close with a cliffhanger. Eberle and justificatory liberals agree about the importance of conscientious engagement. But what does respect require when public reasons are unavailable or evidentially insufficient to justify a public policy? On this point Eberle parts company with JL. I'll turn my attention to this in my next post.
Monday, September 6, 2010
Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics
About a year between posts--I'm feeling sheepish! I'm relaunching my blog, principally because I need a space to get some ideas out on paper, and I find that blog writing is a good way for me to think through things with comments and questions from others. I'm writing a paper this Fall that explores the role of religious conviction in liberal politics. My paper is a reply to Chris Eberle's recent book, entitled (appropriately) Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Eberle offers a dense, tightly argued case against what he calls the "doctrine of restraint." While I find parts of Eberle's argument commendable, I disagree with his main conclusion. My paper is an attempt to rebut his argument, to reaffirm the doctrine of restraint as an important feature of liberal democratic discourse.
Eberle raises two fundamental questions at the heart of current debates about religious conviction in liberal democratic politics:
A. "[I]s it morally appropriate for a citizen . . . to support his favored laws on the basis of his religious convictions?
B. "[I]s it morally appropriate . . . [for him] to support his favored laws on the basis of religious convictions alone?" (8)
The United States has many citizens possessing wide-ranging, incommensurable religious (and non-religious) beliefs. Many religious citizens feel very strongly about these beliefs, and understandably these beliefs inform perceptions of issues on issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, stem cell research, and the like. But to the degree that we are divided about comprehensive beliefs, what role should these beliefs play in informing public policy debates? Laws are coercive; they punish, they limit, and they threaten the sanction of the state when they are broken. Is it appropriate for citizens to support laws on the basis of their religious beliefs, even knowing that these beliefs are not shared by other citizens?
Many liberal theorists say "Yes" to question A. There is nothing disrespectful about religious citizens allowing their religious beliefs to inform their attitudes about public policy. How could it be otherwise? More controversial, however, is B. Justificatory liberals--theorists like John Rawls, Charles Larmore, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Audi, and Amy Gutmann--argue that supporting favored laws solely on the basis of one's religious beliefs is morally inappropriate (i.e. they say NO to question B). We disrespect other citizens when we advocate coercive laws solely on the basis of religious beliefs that they do not accept. We are bad citizens when we do so. According to justificatory liberals, respect in a liberal democracy entails that we offer public justification for coercive laws. We need to find public reasons that other citizens can accept, reasons that do not require them to abandon their own reasonable comprehensive beliefs.
Debates about the role of religious reasons in public discourse are not new, but Eberle does an uncommon job of injecting new life into the conversation with his incisive, balanced description of justificatory liberalism (JL), the principle opponent that he critiques in this book. JL actually encompasses a range of liberalisms that are often treated separately (e.g. Rawlsian liberalism and deliberative democratic theory qualify as forms of JL). Eberle identifies two claims at the heart of justificatory liberalism:
"(1) the Principle of Pursuit: a citizen should pursue public justification for his favored coercive laws.
(2) the Doctrine of Restraint: a citizen should not support any coercive laws for which he lacks a public justification." (68)
Justificatory liberals affirm both (1) and (2). Eberle, in contrast, affirms (1) but denies (2). He agrees with JL that citizens must pursue public justification for favored coercive laws, but he believes that once a citizen has exercised that burden that good citizens may continue to support coercive laws when public reasons are unavailable or public justification unsuccessful. My paper, in short, is meant to reaffirm the importance of (2) and to respond to Eberle's critique of justificatory liberalism.
This post has gotten long. In my next post I'll lay out Eberle's case against the doctrine of restraint.
Eberle raises two fundamental questions at the heart of current debates about religious conviction in liberal democratic politics:
A. "[I]s it morally appropriate for a citizen . . . to support his favored laws on the basis of his religious convictions?
B. "[I]s it morally appropriate . . . [for him] to support his favored laws on the basis of religious convictions alone?" (8)
The United States has many citizens possessing wide-ranging, incommensurable religious (and non-religious) beliefs. Many religious citizens feel very strongly about these beliefs, and understandably these beliefs inform perceptions of issues on issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, stem cell research, and the like. But to the degree that we are divided about comprehensive beliefs, what role should these beliefs play in informing public policy debates? Laws are coercive; they punish, they limit, and they threaten the sanction of the state when they are broken. Is it appropriate for citizens to support laws on the basis of their religious beliefs, even knowing that these beliefs are not shared by other citizens?
Many liberal theorists say "Yes" to question A. There is nothing disrespectful about religious citizens allowing their religious beliefs to inform their attitudes about public policy. How could it be otherwise? More controversial, however, is B. Justificatory liberals--theorists like John Rawls, Charles Larmore, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Audi, and Amy Gutmann--argue that supporting favored laws solely on the basis of one's religious beliefs is morally inappropriate (i.e. they say NO to question B). We disrespect other citizens when we advocate coercive laws solely on the basis of religious beliefs that they do not accept. We are bad citizens when we do so. According to justificatory liberals, respect in a liberal democracy entails that we offer public justification for coercive laws. We need to find public reasons that other citizens can accept, reasons that do not require them to abandon their own reasonable comprehensive beliefs.
Debates about the role of religious reasons in public discourse are not new, but Eberle does an uncommon job of injecting new life into the conversation with his incisive, balanced description of justificatory liberalism (JL), the principle opponent that he critiques in this book. JL actually encompasses a range of liberalisms that are often treated separately (e.g. Rawlsian liberalism and deliberative democratic theory qualify as forms of JL). Eberle identifies two claims at the heart of justificatory liberalism:
"(1) the Principle of Pursuit: a citizen should pursue public justification for his favored coercive laws.
(2) the Doctrine of Restraint: a citizen should not support any coercive laws for which he lacks a public justification." (68)
Justificatory liberals affirm both (1) and (2). Eberle, in contrast, affirms (1) but denies (2). He agrees with JL that citizens must pursue public justification for favored coercive laws, but he believes that once a citizen has exercised that burden that good citizens may continue to support coercive laws when public reasons are unavailable or public justification unsuccessful. My paper, in short, is meant to reaffirm the importance of (2) and to respond to Eberle's critique of justificatory liberalism.
This post has gotten long. In my next post I'll lay out Eberle's case against the doctrine of restraint.
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