About a year between posts--I'm feeling sheepish! I'm relaunching my blog, principally because I need a space to get some ideas out on paper, and I find that blog writing is a good way for me to think through things with comments and questions from others. I'm writing a paper this Fall that explores the role of religious conviction in liberal politics. My paper is a reply to Chris Eberle's recent book, entitled (appropriately) Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Eberle offers a dense, tightly argued case against what he calls the "doctrine of restraint." While I find parts of Eberle's argument commendable, I disagree with his main conclusion. My paper is an attempt to rebut his argument, to reaffirm the doctrine of restraint as an important feature of liberal democratic discourse.
Eberle raises two fundamental questions at the heart of current debates about religious conviction in liberal democratic politics:
A. "[I]s it morally appropriate for a citizen . . . to support his favored laws on the basis of his religious convictions?
B. "[I]s it morally appropriate . . . [for him] to support his favored laws on the basis of religious convictions alone?" (8)
The United States has many citizens possessing wide-ranging, incommensurable religious (and non-religious) beliefs. Many religious citizens feel very strongly about these beliefs, and understandably these beliefs inform perceptions of issues on issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, stem cell research, and the like. But to the degree that we are divided about comprehensive beliefs, what role should these beliefs play in informing public policy debates? Laws are coercive; they punish, they limit, and they threaten the sanction of the state when they are broken. Is it appropriate for citizens to support laws on the basis of their religious beliefs, even knowing that these beliefs are not shared by other citizens?
Many liberal theorists say "Yes" to question A. There is nothing disrespectful about religious citizens allowing their religious beliefs to inform their attitudes about public policy. How could it be otherwise? More controversial, however, is B. Justificatory liberals--theorists like John Rawls, Charles Larmore, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Audi, and Amy Gutmann--argue that supporting favored laws solely on the basis of one's religious beliefs is morally inappropriate (i.e. they say NO to question B). We disrespect other citizens when we advocate coercive laws solely on the basis of religious beliefs that they do not accept. We are bad citizens when we do so. According to justificatory liberals, respect in a liberal democracy entails that we offer public justification for coercive laws. We need to find public reasons that other citizens can accept, reasons that do not require them to abandon their own reasonable comprehensive beliefs.
Debates about the role of religious reasons in public discourse are not new, but Eberle does an uncommon job of injecting new life into the conversation with his incisive, balanced description of justificatory liberalism (JL), the principle opponent that he critiques in this book. JL actually encompasses a range of liberalisms that are often treated separately (e.g. Rawlsian liberalism and deliberative democratic theory qualify as forms of JL). Eberle identifies two claims at the heart of justificatory liberalism:
"(1) the Principle of Pursuit: a citizen should pursue public justification for his favored coercive laws.
(2) the Doctrine of Restraint: a citizen should not support any coercive laws for which he lacks a public justification." (68)
Justificatory liberals affirm both (1) and (2). Eberle, in contrast, affirms (1) but denies (2). He agrees with JL that citizens must pursue public justification for favored coercive laws, but he believes that once a citizen has exercised that burden that good citizens may continue to support coercive laws when public reasons are unavailable or public justification unsuccessful. My paper, in short, is meant to reaffirm the importance of (2) and to respond to Eberle's critique of justificatory liberalism.
This post has gotten long. In my next post I'll lay out Eberle's case against the doctrine of restraint.
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4 comments:
Vic,
First, I admit I may not be qualified to address the question you raise, but assuming you want to know what I think/believe, keep reading.
I firmly disagree with question A; religion should not be used as basis for support of (or opposition against) any law. The basis for all laws should be to maximize individual freedom. This may be expressed as a restriction on what I can do if it impedes on another's freedom, but remember this must apply equally to both sides.
In response to "There is nothing disrespectful about religious citizens allowing their religious beliefs to inform their attitudes about public policy. How could it be otherwise?": of course that is true, but you have subtly changed the point. Of course my religion will inform my attitudes but it should not change the basis for laws.
On the other hand, this question is somewhat mute in the sense that no one can know what motivates another to support (or oppose) anything, we only know what arguments they use to do so.
Vic, have you seen Sandel's new book on justice? He argues that the State cannot maintain a position of neutrality and that it should create legal structures that encourage virtue. David Gordon recently wrote a review of the book answering Sandel's critique of libertarianism at mises.org.
Welcome back to the blogosphere!
Jason, yes, I've read Sandel's book; it is excellent. I'll check out Gordon's critique. I remember finding Sandel's discussion of libertarianism persuasive. You'll recall from our CSC discussions that libertarianism and Rawlsian liberalism suffer from a similar malady, at least in Sandel's communitarian critique of liberalism. I'm actually working on some of this in my long-term project on the ethics of patriotic loyalty.
Dwayne, you and I are probably fairly close in our understanding of religion and liberal politics. Your comment points to one of the important distinctions that is often lost when discussing religious claims in liberal democracy. Religious claims can serve both as (1) motivational foundations for the support of public policy and (2) evidential foundations for the justification of policy. What I hear you saying is that while good citizens may allow religious beliefs to serve motivationally that good citizenship entails that we reject the evidential use of religious claims when debating public policy. Many liberals would agree with this (I actually think this is a better way of stating the point of question A).
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